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Perhaps the biggest story of the surprising 2016 presidential election was Donald Trump’s vic-
tories in the Midwest, which, according to President Obama’s 2012 campaign manager David 
Plouffe, left the “blue Big Ten firewall in ruins.”2 The Columbus Dispatch reported that “one of the 
more stunning aspects of the surprise presidential victory of Republican Donald Trump was the 
way that states in the industrial Midwest fell like dominoes for him.”3 Trump won Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Iowa, and Ohio, all of which Barack Obama had won in both 2008 and 2012.4 Wis-
consin had not voted for the Republican candidate for president since the Reagan 49-state land-
slide of 1984 and Michigan had not since 1988. Iowa had supported Michael Dukakis, Bill Clinton 
twice, and narrowly supported Al Gore in 2000 and George Bush in 2004 before voting for Obama 
twice. Ohio served as a classic bellwether and had voted to support the winner of the presidential 
 
1 Jon K. Lauck is an adjunct professor of history and political science at the University of South Dakota and the 
author of The Lost Region: Toward a Revival of Midwestern History (Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2016). 
2 David Plouffe, “What I Got Wrong About the Election,” New York Times, November 11, 2016. See also Amy 
Walter, “How Trump Broke the Blue Wall,” Cook Political Report, December 9, 2016.  
3 Jessica Wehrman, “GOP Wins Over Union Members in Midwest,” Columbus Dispatch, November 20, 2016.  
4 Trump also won Pennsylvania, which, outside of Philadelphia, is seen as “Midwestern in culture and concerns.” 
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race every year since John F. Kennedy in 1960.5 One goal of this article is to explore the surprising 
shift in voting patterns in Midwestern states during the 2016 election and to draw on some of the 
work done in Midwestern history to better understand and contextualize this shift, which, if it 
becomes semi-permanent, could mark a major transition in presidential politics. Another goal of 
this article is to highlight the possibilities for future research in the field of Midwestern studies 
which have been prompted by these recent events and to suggest additional research possibilities 
more generally.6 
One method of beginning a review of the recent election and tapping the available corpus of 
work on the history of the Midwest is to examine the origins of the Republican Party in the Mid-
west and its subsequent fortunes. Organized in 1854 as an anti-slavery and anti-Southern party – 
and thereby specifically a regional party and one that found particular support among Midwestern 
farmers – the GOP first took shape in meeting halls in Ripon, Wisconsin and Jackson, Michigan 
and Crawfordsville, Iowa (there is debate about the precise origin of the party).7 The Republican 
Party swept the Midwest during the 1850s and the first person to win a presidential race as a 
Republican was Illinoisan Abraham Lincoln in 1860.8 The areas of the Midwest which were set-
tled by New England Yankees and Pennsylvania Quakers and Germans tended to be more sup-
portive of the GOP than areas of the Midwest settled by Southerners, who had migrated in from 
the solidly Democratic South.9 The influence of early settlement patterns on present day voting 
results is still visible, although party loyalties have flipped due to the rise of the GOP in the South 
and the transformation of areas settled by New Englanders into Democratic territory.  
 
5 Kyle Kondik, The Bellwether: Why Ohio Picks the President (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2016); Andrew 
Cayton, “Bellwether Ohio,” American Interest vol. 12, no. 2 (November/December 2016), 45-51.  
6 Most specifically, I hope this article will provide research ideas to the students in my class POLS/HIST 492/592: 
“The Political Culture of the Midwest” at the University of South Dakota. More generally, I hope this article will assist 
those interested in participating in a planned book of essays about post-World War II Midwestern politics.  
7 Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, W.W. Norton, 1978), 149-50; William E. Gienapp, 
The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988); Eric Foner, Free Soil, 
Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1970); Robert Cook, Baptism of Fire: The Republican Party in Iowa, 1838-1878 (Ames, Iowa State University 
Press, 1994); Henry Clyde Hubbert, The Older Middle West, 1840 - 1880: Its Social, Economic and Political Life and 
Sectional Tendencies before, during, and after the Civil War (New York, Russell & Russell, Inc., 1963); Heather Cox 
Richardson, To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party (New York, Basic Books, 2014); na, “Grand Old 
Problem: Where Were the First Republicans,” Associated Press, May 1, 2004.  
8 Douglas R. Egerton, Year of Meteors: Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the Election that Brought on the 
Civil War (New York, Bloomsbury Press, 2010).  
9 Colin Woodard, American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America (New 
York, Penguin, 2012).  
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From the time of the Civil War until the Great Depression, the Republican Party remained 
dominant in the Midwest and presidents such as U.S. Grant (Illinois), Rutherford Hayes (Ohio), 
James Garfield (Ohio), Benjamin Harrison (Indiana), William McKinley (Ohio), William How-
ard Taft (Ohio), Warren Harding (Ohio), and Herbert Hoover (Iowa) hailed from the region. In 
the latter half of the nineteenth-century the region, which had mostly been settled by agrarian 
yeoman, became much less dependent on agriculture as a robust industrial economy took hold and 
the national GOP made efforts to protect Midwestern industry by way of high tariffs. In the early 
decades of the twentieth-century, the factories of the Midwest were highly productive and Henry 
Ford built his famous plants in Dearborn, Michigan and other companies such as General Motors 
took root in Detroit. The raw materials for these industries were shipped in via the Great Lakes 
from Minnesota’s Iron Range and from the southern Midwest’s coal fields. During the labor 
crunch of the World War I era, many African Americans left the segregated South and moved to 
Midwestern cities to find work in the Midwest’s new factories and thereby created another major 
interest group in the Midwest that was especially influential in cities such as Chicago, Detroit, 
Cleveland, and Milwaukee.  
The crisis of the Great Depression jolted the Midwest, as it did the entire nation, and Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal caused the region to partially re-align politically toward the Democrats, 
although the GOP still remained a strong force, especially in small towns, rural areas, and suburbs, 
all of which caused many areas of the Midwest to be politically competitive. In stark comparison 
to the era of pre-1930s GOP dominance in the Midwest, New Deal farm programs and New Deal 
labor laws drew more Midwesterners toward the Democrats.10 During the New Deal, Republicans 
also began to lose their hold on the African American voter, who had previously supported the 
party of Lincoln as liberators but would later become a pillar of the Democratic coalition.11 The 
 
10 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990); Shelton Stromquist and Marvin Bergman (eds), Unionizing the Jungles: Labor and Community 
in the Twentieth-Century Meatpacking Industry (Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 1997); Elizabeth Faue, Com-
munity of Suffering and Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945 (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Theodore Saloutos, The American Farmer and the New Deal (Ames, Iowa 
State University Press, 1982).  
11 Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (Princeton, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1983); Donald J. Lisio, Hoover, Blacks & Lily-Whites: A Study of Southern Strategies (Chapel Hill, Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1985); Richard Sherman, The Republican Party and Black America from McKinley 
to Hoover, 1896–1933 (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1973); Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians: 
The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago (New York, AMS Press, 1969); Eric Schickler, Kathryn Pearson, and Brian D. 
Feinstein, “Congressional Parties and Civil Rights from 1933 to 1972,” Journal of Politics vol. 72, no. 3 (July 2010), 
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New Deal’s promotion of organized labor was especially influential in the Midwest’s industrial 
areas, which saw the rise of powerful unions such as the United Auto Workers which were loyal 
to the Democratic Party.12 In the later stages of the twentieth-century, however, the once-powerful 
and employment-generating manufacturing sector of the Midwest began to shrivel in the face of 
stiff foreign competition, the movement of factories to low-wage countries such as Mexico, and 
automation.13 The smaller number of farmers in the Midwest and the Democrats’ traditional focus, 
at least in the North, on urban voters and its more recent focus on coastal voters caused a widening 
disconnect with rural Midwesterners. In broad strokes, these were the forces and trends at work in 
the 2016 presidential race in the Midwest.  
 
THE RURAL MIDWEST VOTE 
 
During the 2016 presidential race Midwestern “outstates,” or places outside of metro areas of a 
million-plus people, strongly supported Trump.14 Outstate areas accounted for 61% of the vote in 
Wisconsin, 47% in Michigan, 100% in Iowa (where there is no metro of over a million people), 
and 44% in Ohio.15 President Barack Obama had won outstate Wisconsin (outside of Milwaukee 
and Madison) with 54% and 50% in 2008 and 2012 but Clinton only received the support of 41% 
of rural Wisconsinites; Obama had won outstate Michigan (outside of Detroit and Grand Rapids) 
with 55% and 52% but Clinton only received 41%; Obama had won outstate Ohio (outside of 
Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati) with 48% and 47% but Clinton only received 35%.16 In 
Wisconsin’s 46 non-metro or rural counties Trump won by nearly 20%, a major shift from 2012, 
 
672; Mark Stern, “Party Alignments and Civil Rights: Then and Now,” Presidential Studies Quarterly vol. 25, no. 3 
(Summer 1995), 414.   
12 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970 (Detroit, 
Wayne State University Press, 2005).  
13 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Aban-
donment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York, Basic Books, 1984); Edward McClelland, Nothin’ But 
Blue Skies: The Heyday, Hard Times, and Hopes of America’s Industrial Heartland (New York, Bloomsburg Press, 
2013); David Giffels, The Hard Way on Purpose: Essays and Dispatches from the Rust Belt (New York, Scribner, 
2014).  
14 Michael Barone, “Race Was Won (and Lost) in Midwest,” Washington Examiner, November 21, 2016; Aaron 
Zitner and Paul Overberg, “Rural Vote Fuels Trump; Clinton Loses Urban Grip,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 
2016.  
15 Michael Barone, “Race Was Won (and Lost) in Midwest,” Washington Examiner, November 21, 2016.  
16 Michael Barone, “Race Was Won (and Lost) in Midwest,” Washington Examiner, November 21, 2016. 
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when Obama and Mitt Romney split this vote.17 In 2008, Obama carried 40 of Wisconsin’s 47 
rural counties; in 2016, Trump carried 42 of those counties.18 In Ohio, Trump fared better than 
Romney in 42 counties, most of them relatively small and rural.19 Overall Clinton lost rural voters 
by a 2-1 margin, which was much worse than Obama had fared.20 By far the largest shift of voters 
to the GOP during the 2016 presidential election occurred in the rural Midwest and, in particular, 
the “most striking change occurred in counties along the junction of Illinois, Wisconsin and 
Iowa.”21 After the election, some commentators criticized the Clinton “campaign’s decision to 
largely surrender the rural vote to the GOP” and for its failure to name a “rural council” or to build 
a rural campaign infrastructure.22 Congressman Collin Peterson, who represented rural Western 
Minnesota and who was nearly defeated as part of the Trump wave, lamented the state of the 
Democrats in the rural Midwest and conceded “we’ve become an urban party.”23 Some Democratic 
strategists, however, discounted such concerns and argued that Democrats should focus less time 
on the rural Midwest and instead focus on their urban strengths and on the Sun Belt.24  
Whatever strategy the Democrats adopt, their poor rural returns were clear in the Midwest in 
2016. In rural areas of Michigan, for example, Trump far out-performed Michigan native Mitt 
Romney in counties such as Montmorency, Kalkaska, and Osceola, which supported Trump with 
 
17 Craig Gilbert, “Difference-makers in Trump’s Wisconsin Win,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 12, 
2016; Dan Balz, “Democrats Search for a Path Back into Rural America’s Good Graces,” Washington Post, December 
10, 2016; Craig Gilbert, “As Dust Settles, Parts of Political Map Scrambled,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 
4, 2016. 
18 Ben Merriman, “Caught in the Middle,” Chronicle of Higher Education, November 20, 2016.  
19 Henry J. Gomez and Rich Exner, “A Big Reason Why Donald Trump Beat Hillary Clinton in Ohio: He Ran Up 
the Score in Appalachia,” Cleveland.com [the new designation for the Cleveland Plain Dealer), November 10, 2016.  
20 Molly Ball, “Why Hillary Clinton Lost,” Atlantic Monthly (November 2016).  
21 Lazaro Gamio and Dan Keating, “How Trump Redrew the Electoral Map, from Sea to Shining Sea,” New York 
Times, November 9, 2016 (striking); Emily Badger, Quoctrung Bui, and Adam Pearce, “The Election Highlighted a 
Growing Rural-Urban Split,” New York Times, November 11, 2016; Michael Barone, “Donald Trump and the Outstate 
Midwest Redraw the Partisan Lines,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2016.  
22 Helena Bottemiller Evich, “Revenge of the Rural Voter,” Politico, November 13, 2016.  
23 Maggie Severns and Theodoric Meyer, “House Democrats Lament Blue-Collar Collapse,” Politico, November 
18, 2016 (Peterson); Alex Roarty, “Rural Democrats: Party Ignored Us, Suffered the Consequences,” Roll Call, De-
cember 2, 2016; Greg Jaffe, “Vilsack’s Tough Message for Fellow Democrats: Stop Writing Off Rural America,” 
Washington Post, November 28, 2016; Mallory Shelbourne, “Obama’s Agriculture Secretary: Dems Need to Talk to 
Rural America,” The Hill, November 28, 2016.  
24 Mark J. Rozell and Whet Smith, “Memo to Democrats: Look to the Southwest and Southeast, Not Midwest,” 
Politico, November 30, 2016; Gabriel Debenedetti, “Democrats Wrestle with Rust Belt Dilemma,” Politico, Novem-
ber 26, 2016; Alana Semuels, “Democrats Don’t Have an Easy Answer for the Rust Belt,” Atlantic Monthly (Novem-
ber 2016); Ronald Brownstein, “Has the Balance of Power Shifted from the Rustbelt to the Sunbelt?” Atlantic Monthly 
(November 2016); Gabriel Debenedetti, “Democratic Donors Call for Clinton Campaign Post-Mortem,” Politico, De-
cember 15, 2016.  
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nearly 70% of the vote.25 Clinton only won 8 Michigan counties, all of which were urban or uni-
versity-oriented.26 One consultant blamed Democrats for focusing too much on urban Detroit: 
“You can saturate Detroit all you want, but when you drive past 23 Mile or north of Bay City, all 
you saw was Trump. There was no effort whatsoever to make a dent in that area.”27 Trump won 
Michigan’s rural areas and small towns 57%-38%, improving on Romney’s 2012 margin of 53%-
46%.28 
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel noted that it was “hard to overstate Trump’s dominance in rural 
Wisconsin” and reported that he won rural voters by a 27% margin. In 2008, Obama had carried 
the same rural voters by 8%. Trump won 18 rural counties in Wisconsin that Obama had won in 
2012 (overall, Trump won 22 counties in Wisconsin that Obama had won in 2012). One of the 
“last bastions of rural white Democrats in America,” the area of Southwestern Wisconsin near the 
Mississippi River known as The Driftless, went for Trump.29 Counties such as Pepin, Buffalo, 
Crawford, Vernon, Grant, Lafayette, and Trempealeau, which had not voted for a Republican 
presidential candidate in decades, supported Trump. Trempealeau County was made famous in 
historical circles by the Nebraskan Merle Curti, who conducted an intense microcosmic analysis 
of the settlement and development of the county while a professor at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison.30 Trump won Wisconsin’s rural areas and small towns 63%-34%, improving on Rom-
ney’s 2012 margin of 53%-46%.31 After the election, some Democratic consultants urged party 
leaders to not be distracted by these poor badger state returns and argued that the future of the 
Democratic Party was in the diversifying Sun Belt and South: “It does not lie in rural Wisconsin.”32  
 
25 Chad Livengood, Michael Gerstein, and Joel Kurth, “Trump Flipped 12 Counties to Win Michigan,” Detroit 
News, November 10, 2016.  
26 Chad Livengood, Michael Gerstein, and Joel Kurth, “Trump Flipped 12 Counties to Win Michigan,” Detroit 
News, November 10, 2016.  
27 Kathleen Gray, “Trump Message, Voter Turnout Led to GOP Wins and Dem Losses,” Detroit Free Press, No-
vember 9, 2016.  
28 Chuck Todd, Mark Murray, and Carrie Dann, “How Rural America Fueled Trump’s Win,” NBC News, Novem-
ber 9, 2016.  
29 For Wisconsin data, see Craig Gilbert, “Difference-makers in Trump’s Wisconsin Win,” Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, November 12, 2016 (quotation). See also Craig Gilbert, Todd Spangler, and Bill Laitner, “How Clinton Lost 
‘Blue Wall’ States of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and Detroit Free Press (co-
operative report), November 10, 2016. 
30 Merle Curti, The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County (Stan-
ford, Stanford University Press, 1959).  
31 Chuck Todd, Mark Murray, and Carrie Dann, “How Rural America Fueled Trump’s Win,” NBC News, Novem-
ber 9, 2016.  
32 Reid J. Epstein and Janet Hook, “In Their Coastal Citadels, Democrats Argue Over What Went Wrong,” Wall 
Street Journal, November 18, 2016.  
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The two states Clinton won in the Midwest, Minnesota and Illinois, were highly influenced by 
singular and dense urban areas, the Twin Cities and Chicago. In perhaps the biggest surprise of 
the 2016 election, Trump only lost Minnesota, which is known for its liberal politics and had not 
voted for a Republican presidential candidate since 1972, by 1.5%. In the famously labor-oriented 
Iron Range, Trump won Hibbing, the hometown of Bob Dylan.33 But 60% of the Minnesotans 
live in the Twin Cities metro area, making the dominance of one urban core in Minnesota similar 
to the role of Chicago in Illinois. Minnesota’s urban center simply holds more votes than “outstate 
Minnesota,” where Trump did well.34 Even in northern Minnesota, “long a Democratic-Farmer 
Labor stronghold,” Trump won Beltrami, Itasca, Mahnomen, and Koochiching counites.35 Over-
all, Trump won 78 of Minnesota’s 87 counties.36 In Illinois, Trump also won the vast majority of 
counties – 91 of 102 – but Clinton won big in Chicago’s Cook County, where she earned half of 
her votes, and thus won the state.37 
The great disparity in voting between rural counties and urban areas proved true across the 
Midwest. Trump won 93 of 99 counties in Iowa, for example, and flipped 32 counties that had 
voted for Obama in 2012.38 Trump’s Iowa victory was bigger than Reagan’s 1984 reelection land-
slide.39 In a pattern common to the larger Midwest, Trump lost six counties in Iowa that were 
home to urban centers (Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, and Davenport) and universities (University 
of Iowa, Iowa State University, and the University of Northern Iowa) but he won the remaining 
93. Trump won 88 of 92 counties in Indiana; 75 of 83 counties in Michigan; 61 of 66 counties in 
South Dakota; 81 of 88 counties in Ohio; and 59 of 72 counties in Wisconsin. Trump won every 
county in Kansas but one (home to the University of Kansas); every county but two in North 
Dakota (which were Indian reservation counties); every county but two in Nebraska (which were 
 
33 Greta Kaul, “Greater Minnesota Struggling Economically, Data Shows Worst-Hit Areas Cast Ballots for 
Trump,” MinnPost, November 29, 2016. On the Iron Range, see Jeff Manuel’s recent book Taconite Dreams: The 
Struggle to Sustain Mining on Minnesota’s Iron Range, 1915-2000 (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
2015), which won the 2016 Hamlin Garland Prize awarded by the Midwestern History Association.  
34 Patrick Condon, “Clinton Narrowly Wins Minnesota,” Star Tribune, November 9, 2016.  
35 Greta Kaul, “Greater Minnesota Struggling Economically, Data Shows Worst-Hit Areas Cast Ballots for 
Trump,” MinnPost, November 29, 2016 (stronghold); Greta Kaul and Tom Nehil, “Where Trump Did Better than Mitt 
Romney in Minnesota, and Where He Did Worse,” MinnPost, November 11, 2016.  
36 Patrick Condon, “Clinton Narrowly Wins Minnesota,” Star Tribune, November 9, 2016.  
37 Cecilia Reyes and Geoff Hing, “Election Analysis: On the Edge of Illinois’ Urban-Rural Divide,” Chicago Trib-
une, November 17, 2016; Kyle Bentle, Jonathon Berlin, and Ryan Max, “Illinois, a Blue Island in a Red Sea: Data 
Analysis,” Chicago Tribune, November 15, 2016.  
38 Marshall Cohen and Jeff Simon, “How Democrats Lost Dubuque and Middle America,” CNN, December 14, 
2006; Krista Johnson, “Clinton Drops 32 Counties Obama Won in 2012,” Iowa Watch, November 9, 2016.  
39 Jason Noble, “Donald Trump Won Iowa with a Pitch-Perfect Message to Iowans Desperate for Change,” Des 
Moines Register, November 9, 2016.  
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home to Omaha and the University of Nebraska); and every county but three in Missouri (which 
were home to the University of Missouri, Kansas City, and St. Louis). And, as noted, he won 78 
of Minnesota’s 87 counties and 91 of Illinois’s 102 counties. The rural Midwestern counties where 
Clinton performed well, it should be noted, were often Indian reservation counties, the electoral 
history of which would make an excellent research project, as would the history of internal reser-
vation politics, which has received minimal attention from scholars.  
A longer-term perspective on the fortunes of Democrats in the rural Midwest would make some 
of the returns of 2016 less jarring. The GOP originated in the rural Midwest, after all, and the 
GOP has historically been dominant with rural voters, at least until the Great Depression. Richard 
Jensen and Paul Kleppner did much to explain these voting patterns for the late-nineteenth cen-
tury.40 In contrast to the criticisms of some Democrats after the 2016 election, however, there have 
been prominent Democratic leaders who have worked hard to earn rural Midwestern votes. This 
would include the many Midwesterners in FDR’s Department of Agriculture who fought for pol-
icies to maintain the long-standing agrarian order of small farmers in the Midwest and, in the 
process, had to battle many Easterners who had little sympathy for the region.41 It would also 
include the farm policies of Missourian Harry Truman during the 1940s and also Hubert Humph-
rey, who was elected mayor of Minneapolis in 1945 but then went on to a long career in the U.S. 
Senate and in national politics where he was a vigorous supporter of Midwestern family farms.42 
George McGovern’s entry into politics via his criticism of farm policies during the 1950s serves as 
another example.43 But these examples also serve to make the point that Democrats in recent years 
have had few prominent voices from rural America and that their embrace of various forms of 
cultural liberation have alienated them from more traditional and conservative rural parts of the 
Midwest.  
 
40 Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896 (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1971); Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 
(New York, The Free Press, 1971).  
41 Jess Gilbert, Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal (New Haven, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2015).  
42 Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967). 
On the Iowan Henry Wallace, see Thomas W. Devine, Henry Wallace’s 1948 Presidential Campaign and the Future 
of Postwar Liberalism (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2013).  
43 Thomas J. Knock, The Life and Times of George McGovern: The Rise of a Prairie Statesman (Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press, 2016), 158-59, 165, 169; Jon K. Lauck, “George S. McGovern and the Farmer: South Dakota 
Politics 1953-1962,” South Dakota Politics vol. 32, no. 4 (Winter 2003), 331-53. 
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Despite some work on the history of the farm program and of progressive farm advocates, which 
is, on balance, fairly dated, this scholarship is not extensive. If there is one area of the Midwest 
deserving of particular attention from historians and researchers more generally it is the rural Mid-
west, which has not been a popular area of study for scholars in recent decades. Such efforts will 
be able to rely on important building blocks.44 The unwinding of the old agrarian rural order and 
rural depopulation and the resulting economic friction and cultural consequences for the rural 
Midwest are especially important topics.45 This would certainly include the 1980s farm crisis.46 
Given the themes of the 2016 election, rural v. urban cultural tensions are also important to ex-
plore, including their long history.47 So are tensions over the coastal dominance of the media and 
entertainment industries and rural Midwestern protests thereof.48 The growing number of studies 
of American conservatism published over the past decade have done little to examine the rural 
Midwest, which, after the 2016 election, is now particularly relevant. These studies would be es-
pecially valuable if they extended back into the nineteenth-century and the era when the GOP was 
first organized and even before given the limited historiography on this topic.  
 
WORKING CLASS VOTERS 
 
In addition to a strong performance by the GOP in rural areas during the 2016 election, the 
party also performed well among non-college educated whites, some of whom lived in rural areas 
 
44 J.L. Anderson (ed), The Rural Midwest since World War II (DeKalb, IL, Northern Illinois University Press, 
2014); Paul K. Conkin, A Revolution Down on the Farm: The Transformation of American Agriculture since 1929 
(Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2009); David B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).  
45 Jon K. Lauck, American Agriculture and the Problem of Monopoly: The Political Economy of Grain Belt Farm-
ing, 1953-1980 (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2000); J.L. Anderson, Industrializing the Corn Belt: Agricul-
ture, Technology, and Environment, 1945-1972 (DeKalb, IL, Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Robert Wuth-
now, Remaking the Heartland: Middle America since the 1950s (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011); Jon K. 
Lauck, “‘The Silent of Artillery of Time’: Understanding Social Change in the Rural Midwest,” Great Plains Quar-
terly vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 1999), 245-55.  
46 See Middle West Review vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015) for a special issue on the 1980s farm crisis.  
47 Timothy B. Spears, Chicago Dreaming: Midwesterners and the City, 1871-1919 (Chicago, University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005); James H. Shideler, “Flappers and Philosophers, and Farmers: Rural-Urban Tensions of the Twen-
ties,” Agricultural History vol. 47, no. 4 (October 1973), 283-99; Jon K. Lauck, “The Myth of the Midwestern ‘Revolt 
from the Village,’” MidAmerica vol. 40 (2013), 39-85; Don Kirschner, City and Country: Rural Responses to Urban-
ization in the 1920s (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1970).  
48 Robert L. Dorman, The Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America, 1920-1945 (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Jon K. Lauck, From Warm Center to Ragged Edge: The Erosion of Mid-
western Literary and Historical Regionalism, 1920-1965 (Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2017).   
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but many of whom would be more closely associated with Midwestern industrial areas. This group 
favored Trump by a margin of 39% (Romney only won this group by 26%).49 These numbers 
indicate that many traditionally working class and Democratic areas of the “Rust Belt” moved 
toward Trump.50 In the wake of the New Deal during the 1940s, nearly 70% of workers voted for 
Democrats, but this had fallen to 35% by 1980 and continued to fall in subsequent decades.51 In 
2016, Trump won working class white men by a 50% margin; Trump won 67% of all white work-
ing class voters.52 Obama had won union households by 18% in 2012, but Clinton, according to 
the exit polls, only won them by 8%, or 51%-43%.53 According to the AFL-CIO’s own survey, 
union support for Clinton came in at 56% compared to 65% for Obama in 2012.54 In Michigan, 
Trump won working class whites overall by a 61%-31% margin.55 In Ohio, Trump won union 
voters 49%-44%, a major turnaround from 2012, when Obama won 60% of Ohio’s union voters.56 
Robert Bruno, director of the Labor Education Program at the University of Illinois-Chicago, 
observed that the “Democratic Party has lost its footing among working people and allowed the 
Republican Party to become the party of the working class. And that’s an astonishing thing to have 
to admit.”57 Ohio State University political scientist Paul Beck saw the 2016 voting results as a 
“white working class revolt against the Democratic Party.”58 “Politically, it’s a complete rout,” said 
John Russo, one-time director of the Center for Working-Class Studies at Youngstown State 
 
49 Aaron Zitner and Paul Overberg, “Rural Vote Fuels Trump; Clinton Loses Urban Grip,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 9, 2016. 
50 Nate Cohn, “Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites,” New York Times, November 9, 2016.  
51 Emmett Rensin, “The Smug Style in American Liberalism,” Vox, April 21, 2016; Robert Reich, “Democrats 
Once Represented the Working Class. Not Any More,” Guardian, November 10, 2016.  
52 Reid J. Epstein and Janet Hook, “In Their Coastal Citadels, Democrats Argue Over What Went Wrong,” Wall 
Street Journal, November 18, 2016; Ronald Brownstein, “How the Rustbelt Paved Trump’s Road to Victory,” Atlantic 
Monthly (November 2016).  
53 Molly Ball, “Why Hillary Clinton Lost,” Atlantic Monthly (November 2016); Jessica Wehrman, “GOP Wins 
Over Union Members in Midwest,” Columbus Dispatch, November 20, 2016. For a prescient prediction of Clinton’s 
problems with union households in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, see Noam Scheiber, “Unions Lean 
Democratic, but Donald Trump Gets Members’ Attention,” New York Times, January 29, 2016.  
54 Melanie Trottman, “Union-Member Support for Clinton Fell from Obama in 2012, AFL-CIO Survey Shows,” 
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ber 27, 2016.  
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News, November 10, 2016.  
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University.59 Trump’s message that free trade deals hurt workers, especially the North American 
Free Trade Agreement passed by the Clinton administration during the early 1990s, proved espe-
cially powerful in the industrial Midwest.60 Sociologist Michael McQuarrie emphasized the re-
gional nature of the election and how Clinton “was a terrible candidate for the Rust Belt” given 
her husband’s shepherding of NAFTA and because the Clintons were “avatars of free trade, finan-
cialization and identity politics, a triumvirate of characteristics that associates them pretty directly 
with what many people associate with the causes of Rust Belt decline and crisis.”61 “Trump is 
president,” he argued, “because of a regional revolt.”62  
In Michigan, commentators again focused on the importance of Macomb County, a working 
class area next to Detroit that John F. Kennedy had won in 1960 with 63% of the vote and LBJ 
had won four years later with 75% of the vote.63 Macomb County became the symbolic home of 
the “Reagan Democrats” as it flipped to supporting Ronald Reagan, who won 66% of the vote in 
the county in 1984.64 Trump won Macomb County 54%-42%, prevailing in the county by roughly 
50,000 votes in a year when turnout in the county was up 4%.65 In 2012, Obama had won Macomb 
County 52%-48%, or by 16,000 votes. In 2008, Obama had won Macomb County 53%-44%, or 
by 39,000 votes. Reporting from Warren, Michigan in Macomb County revealed a deep distrust 
of Clinton and also indicated that voters were not enthusiastic about Trump but chose him because 
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Journal, November 10, 2016; Tom Troy, “Donald Trump Captures Ohio, Presidency,” Toledo Blade, November 9, 
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(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).  
61 Michael McQuarrie, “How the Rust Belt Delivered Trump the Presidency: A Deep Dive,” Newsweek, November 
19, 2016.  
62 Michael McQuarrie, “How the Rust Belt Delivered Trump the Presidency: A Deep Dive,” Newsweek, November 
19, 2016.  
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Thomas B. Edsall, “The Not-So-Silent White Majority,” New York Times, November 17, 2016.  
64 Stanley Greenberg, James Carville, Andrew Baumann, Karl Agne, and Jesse Contario, Back to Macomb: Reagan 
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they wanted the change in direction that Trump provided.66 This major shift in Macomb County 
was part of what Wayne State University political science professor Timothy Bledsoe called a “re-
volt of working class whites…who’d been part of the Democratic coalition for years.”67 Overall, 
Trump flipped 12 Michigan counties that voted for Obama in 2012, including working class coun-
ties such as Bay, Eaton, Monroe, and Saginaw.68 In the final tally, Trump won Michigan by 10,704 
votes.69  
In Wisconsin, Trump also benefitted from a “seismic shift in the blue collar vote.”70 While 
Romney won the white working class in Wisconsin by 8% in 2012, Trump won them by 28% in 
2016.71 In 2012, Obama won union households in Wisconsin by 33%; Clinton won them in 2016 
by 10%.72 In LaCrosse, Obama won 58% of the vote in 2012, but Clinton only won 44% in 2016; 
in Racine, Obama won 51% in 2012, but Clinton only won 37% in 2016.73 Trump also won Green 
Bay’s Brown County, a semi-industrial swing county where Clinton underperformed Obama in 
2012 by 7%, and in the broader and frequently contested Fox Valley.74 Kenosha, south of Milwau-
kee and north of Chicago, had voted for Obama and Bill Clinton twice and against Bush twice 
and had supported Mondale and Dukakis in 1984 and 1988. But in 2016 it voted for Trump.75  
Similar to the doubts expressed by Michigan voters, 63% of Wisconsinites had an unfavorable view 
of Trump, but he still won.76   
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Similar patterns prevailed in Ohio. Trump won Stark County, home to the city of Canton, a 
once-prominent steel town, by 17% compared to a draw between Romney and Obama in 2012; 
Trump tied in Lorain County, once home to Toni Morrison and which favored Obama by 14% 
in 2012.77 Trump lost Summit County, home to Akron, but cut the Democratic margin from 2012 
in half and he won 24 of the county’s 31 towns.78 In Youngstown, which Obama had won by 63%-
35% in 2012, Trump essentially drew even, losing only 50%-47% in a traditionally Democratic 
county.79 In May 2016 the long-serving chairman of the Mahoning County (Youngstown) Dem-
ocratic Party had sent a detailed memo to the Clinton campaign about the erosion of support for 
her in the area and the growing amount of support for Trump but he received no response.80 The 
chairman had to kick off 18 members of his Democratic central committee because they were 
supporting Trump.81 After the election, Democratic Congressman Tim Ryan, who represented 
Youngstown, led an effort to topple the Democratic leader in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
the Bay Area Californian Nancy Pelosi. Ryan’s home of Trumbull County, Ohio had just voted 
for a Republican presidential candidate for the first time since 1972.82 Ryan argued that the Dem-
ocrats had become a coastal party and had forgotten the Midwest, but he unsurprisingly lost the 
vote in a caucus in which a third of the membership was from California, New York, and Massa-
chusetts.83  
The support for Trump among working class voters was further highlighted by his diminished 
support in the wealthy, traditionally-Republican suburbs of the Midwest, where Clinton’s criti-
cisms of Trump’s brashness found a more receptive audience. Trump underperformed, for exam-
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ple, in the “affluent, conservative Midwestern suburban stronghold” of Hamilton County, Indi-
ana.84 So too in Boone County in suburban Indianapolis, where Trump performed 8% poorer than 
Romney.85 In Ohio, Trump’s support in the Columbus suburb of Delaware County dropped from 
Romney’s in 2012 – the county gave Trump the lowest margin of victory, 16%, for any Republican 
presidential candidate since Barry Goldwater.86 The same pattern was evident in the wealthier 
sections of Summit County, Ohio around Akron.87 In Michigan’s tony Oakland County Trump 
also slipped 3% below Romney. Trump’s margin of victory in key Republican suburban counties 
in Wisconsin also slipped. In Waukesha County, for example, which Romney won by 34%, Trump 
only won by 28% and Trump trailed the performance of Republican U.S. Senate candidate Ron 
Johnson by 10% in the county.88 Similarly, in Ozaukee County, Romney won by 30% in 2012, but 
Trump only won by 19%.89 These suburban counties in Wisconsin had been the “reddest” counties 
in Wisconsin in recent decades but in 2016 that designation went to more rural Northern counties, 
a sign of Trump’s strength among working class Midwestern voters and lessened support, vis a vis 
Romney, among wealthier Republicans. To underscore the point, River Hills, the wealthiest place 
in Wisconsin, voted Democratic for the first time in 90 years.90 
However the role of workers in the 2016 election season is ultimately interpreted, the long-term 
development of the industrial Midwest has proved to be fertile territory for historians. Labor his-
torians have studied the region’s industrial workers for decades.91 This includes the study of mas-
culine ideals in the era of industrialism, a particularly important topic given the prominent role of 
working class men in the outcome of the 2016 election.92 The role of religion and tradition among 
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workers and workers’ role in modern cultural conflicts are similarly important.93 So is the role of 
1960s and post-1960s cultural liberalism.94 How all these cultural conflicts corresponded with a 
painful era of deindustrialization is also critical to understand.95 For future researchers, the long-
term story of how Midwestern workers once-loyal to the Democrats of the New Deal era became 
frustrated with later Democrats who organized as a “new party of multicultural cosmopolitanism,” 
as some frustrated Democratic strategists see it, is ideal for future study and highly relevant to 
Midwestern history.96  
 
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTE 
 
Another major factor in Clinton’s defeats in the Midwest was her weak performance with Af-
rican American voters. In Milwaukee city council District 15, for example, which is 84% black, 
voter turnout dropped 20% and local voters were unenthusiastic about Clinton.97 The Clinton 
campaign failed to send prominent surrogates such as the Obamas to Milwaukee in order to shore 
up this vote and Clinton herself did not visit Wisconsin after the July convention.98 As a result, 
Clinton received 289,000 votes in Milwaukee County, down from Obama’s 328,000 in 2012. The 
Clinton campaign devoted few resources to these key areas. The Clinton campaign and its allied 
groups spent more money on advertising in Omaha (presumably to help Clinton in Western Iowa) 
during the final weekend of the campaign than it did in Wisconsin and Michigan combined.99 
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Democratic pollster Paul Maslin said “It’s nothing short of malpractice that [the Clinton] cam-
paign didn’t look at the electoral college and put substantial resources into states like Michigan 
and Wisconsin.”100 The Clinton campaign did seem to recognize the dire situation in Michigan a 
few days before the election, but they were not able to reverse the situation.101 In heavily African 
American Detroit, Clinton received nearly 50,000 fewer votes than Obama had in 2012 and in 
Wayne County overall Clinton received nearly 80,000 fewer votes than Obama in 2012.102 Voter 
turnout in Detroit dropped from 51% in 2012 to 48% in 2016.103 In Genesee County, home to 
Flint, where Obama had won with 64% in 2012 and 66% in 2008, Clinton won with only 54%.104 
In Cleveland’s Cuyahoga County African American turnout was down 11% from 2012.105 Not 
only was raw support for Clinton down among African Americans in 2016, but a higher percentage 
of African Americans supported Trump than had supported Romney in 2012. African Americans 
supported Clinton 88%-8%, a drop from their 93%-6% support of Obama in 2012.106 Support for 
Trump among African American men actually increased to 13%.107  
Those interested in studying these patterns and the deeper story of African American voting in 
the Midwest will be blessed with a rich historiography. One of the more popular areas of study in 
African American history in recent decades has been the Great Migration of blacks from the South 
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to the North and, in particular, the movement of blacks to Midwestern cities.108 Chicago in par-
ticular has drawn heavy interest from researchers.109 But Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Cincinnati 
have also attracted researchers.110 More recently, researchers have turned to less obvious urban 
areas such as the Twin Cities of Minnesota and Cedar Rapids, Iowa.111 All of these cities have also 
contributed to a recent round of works about the civil rights movement in the North.112 The his-
tories of African Americans in the urban Midwest help to provide a critical context for the im-
portance of African Americans to the Democratic coalition in states such as Michigan, where lower 
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black turnout arguably cost Clinton the state in 2016. Cities such as Flint also provide an oppor-
tunity to examine the intersection of race and deindustrialization.113 In 1980, General Motors em-
ployed 80,000 people in Flint; today it employs 7,200.114 Deindustrialization in Flint was most 
memorably highlighted by Michael Moore’s film “Roger and Me,” which launched Moore’s ca-
reer.115 The nexus of race and politics in Flint was further highlighted during the 2016 campaign 
by the debate over the Flint water crisis.116 
 
THE LATINO VOTE 
 
Although smaller than in other regions of the United States, the Latino vote in the Midwest is 
also deserving of more research, which could build on some recent and important studies.117 This 
research could include the famous Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, which Trump won after a 
long history of the county supporting Democratic presidential candidates. Trempealeau, unlike 
other Midwestern counties which had suffered through the loss of manufacturing jobs, was the 
“most manufacturing-intensive county in Wisconsin.”118 It became the location of a rapid influx of 
Latinos to work at the dairies, Ashley Furniture, and GNP Co., a chicken producer.119 Its elemen-
tary school went from nearly all white to 73% Hispanic.120 The local fall heritage festival featuring 
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German and Polish food now includes a mariachi band and signs and pamphlets in Spanish.121 
Whatever the location of future research on Hispanics and the Midwest, the voting patterns should 
prove of interest. In 2016, among Latinos, Clinton’s support dropped to 65% from Obama’s 71% 
and Trump gained 2% over Romney’s performance, which surprised many commentators given 
Trump’s call for greater restrictions on immigration.122 
 
CAMPUS VOTERS 
 
Outside of urban concentrations of African American voters, the strongest areas of support for 
Democrats in the Midwest were university towns. In Wisconsin’s Dane County, home to the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison, Clinton won by a margin of 48%, which was higher than Obama 
in 2012 and higher than any other Democratic presidential candidate in history.123 In Michigan, 
Clinton also won Washtenaw County, home of Ann Arbor and the University of Michigan, with 
68% of the vote.124 In Johnson County, Iowa, home to Iowa City and the University of Iowa, 
Clinton beat Trump 65%-27%.125 Clinton won Clay County, South Dakota, home to the Univer-
sity of South Dakota, with 51% (the other four counties Clinton won in South Dakota were Indian 
reservation counties). Athens County, Ohio, home to Ohio University, also turned in its vote for 
Clinton, but she did 10% worse than Obama, a “surprisingly weak performance there,” according 
to analysts.126 When Clinton staffers organized an event in Athens “they drew little interest.”127 
Tensions between university towns in the Midwest and more rural counties or outstate areas are 
also a worthwhile research topic. Many people in rural Wisconsin, for example, see Madison as 
the “domain of hippie professors and rich-kid students” and see professors as “fixated on bizarre 
topics of little relevance.”128 Conflict between Madison and other parts of Wisconsin have also 
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been heightened in recent years by friction between Wisconsin GOP governor Scott Walker and 
the faculty.129 Similar dynamics are at work in Kansas with respect to Lawrence and the rest of the 
state and these tensions have a history worthy of deeper exploration.130 In 2016, the only county 
that Clinton won in Kansas was Douglas County, home to the University of Kansas.  
 
THE CULTURAL DIVIDE 
 
As demonstrated by the starkly different voting patterns between university counties and rural 
Midwestern counties, the election returns in 2016 exposed cultural divisions in the Midwest and 
the nation that are worthy of serious examination.131 Demographer William Frey of the Brookings 
Institution called this a “cultural-generation gap” between rural Republican Trump voters and 
modern urban Democratic voters.132 Long-time reporter, Midwestern analyst, and author Richard 
Longworth argued that it was “impossible to overstate the alienation between the two Americas, 
between global citizens and the global left-behinds, between the great cities that run the nation’s 
economy and media, and the hinterland that feels not only cheated but, worse, disrespected.”133 
Rural whites lived, some argued, with a “cruel sense of being forgotten by the political class and 
condescended to by the cultural one.”134 Clinton aides conceded their failure to develop a rural 
strategy and admitted that connecting to rural voters is a “tough slog” given the Democrats’ pro-
gressive priorities: “It’s hard to speak to rural America. It’s very regionally specific. It feels daunting. 
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You have these wings of the party, progressives, and it’s hard to talk to those people and people in 
rural America, and not seem like you’re talking out of both sides of your mouth.”135 The founder 
of the Center for Rural Strategies, Dee Davis, noted that what “Trump did in rural areas was try 
to appeal to folks culturally” and contrasted this outreach with Clinton’s denunciation of half of 
Trump’s supporters as “deplorables.”136 Davis also explained how rural voters were attuned to a 
candidate’s statements and posture and how they focused on “the tones, the references, the cul-
ture.”137  
University of Wisconsin-Madison political science professor Katherine Cramer’s timely work 
on rural Wisconsin spoke directly to these questions of respect, alienation, and power. She revealed 
the “pervasiveness of resentment toward the cities and urban elites” and how rural Wisconsinites 
felt that the “key decisions were made in the major metro areas of Madison and Milwaukee, then 
decreed out to the rest of the state, with little listening being done to people like them.”138 Cramer 
downplayed race as a factor in the election and highlighted the importance of a lack of “respect” 
toward rural concerns and noted the belief that urban elites “ridiculed rural folks as uneducated 
racists.”139 Cramer found the emergence of a “rural consciousness,” or a local and rooted identity 
which contrasts with a more coastal cosmopolitanism.140 For these rural voters, “urban” does not 
connote race, but serves as “code for class, power, money, and the Democratic Party.”141 Cramer’s 
work on the development and growth of a stronger sense of rural Midwestern identity, one rooted 
in place and thus linked to continuing regionalist sentiments, will have major implications for 
Midwestern studies.142 
Dynamics similar to those in the rural Midwest were also highly visible within the ranks of the 
Midwestern working class, which was drawn to Trump’s stark rhetoric and criticism of cultural 
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and media elites. Long-time political commentator Ronald Brownstein argued that “Trump’s vis-
ceral connection with older, non-urban, and especially blue-collar whites has rattled the founda-
tions of the Democrat’s Rustbelt pillars.”143 One MFA program professor who supported Clinton 
also offered thoughts on his working class background and how some Americans feel alienated 
from the culture and pointed to efforts to reduce the use of the phrase “Merry Christmas,” the 
prominence of Black Lives Matter (“What! My life doesn’t matter?”), and the frequent headlines 
about the need for bathrooms for the transgendered.144 A progressive law professor confessed her 
frustration with how Democrats were “obsessed with cultural issues” and how this repeatedly un-
dermined Democrats’ ability to discuss employment and economic policy: “I fully understand why 
transgender bathrooms are important, but I also understand why progressives’ obsession with pri-
oritizing cultural issues infuriates many Americans whose chief concerns are economic.”145  
Cultural conflicts were also linked to criticisms of the mass media, which Trump frequently 
lampooned. The founder of Belt Publishing (as in “Rust Belt”) in Cleveland commented after the 
election on the common refrain that the media had become “too centralized on the coasts; the 
media ignored the Midwest” and noted that Midwestern newspapers had been “decimated” and 
that there was “almost no regional or local media left.”146 The limited writing about the Midwest 
by coastal reporters, she noted, was targeted at a wealthy coastal audience of “virtual tourists spend-
ing a few minutes gawking at the other half” and carried a “colonial tinge.”147 The South Dakota-
native Tom Brokaw, after several decades of observing the scene in Manhattan, argued that the 
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news media remained “pretty confined” to “the Eastern Seaboard” and in need of additional per-
spectives.148 The editors of the New York Times conceded that “we’ve got to do a much better job 
of being on the road, out in the country, talking to different kinds of people than the people we 
talk to – especially if you happen to be a New York-based news organization – and remind our-
selves that New York is not the real world.”149 Professor Mark Lilla, as part of his warning about 
the extremes of identity politics, counseled the press to “begin educating itself about parts of the 
country that have been ignored.”150 Others similarly urged academics to pay closer attention to the 
Rust Belt and its history and to life in general in the interior of the country.151 Madison Avenue 
advertisers, ever responsive to cultural trends, adjusted to these cultural criticisms after the election 
– they announced that they would be reorienting their work away from “metro elite imagery” and 
more toward “Des Moines and Scranton.”152 When hiring workers, they decided a diversity hire 
“can be a farm girl from Indiana as much as a Cuban immigrant who lives in Pensacola.”153  
The narrow visions that limited the media and advertising worlds, some argued, also prevailed 
in the entertainment arena. One commentator noted how an “industry arose to cater to the smug 
style” of the “educated, the coastal, and the professional” in the form of the “Daily Show” and other 
programs which “advanced the idea that liberal orthodoxy was a kind of educated savvy and that 
its opponents were, before anything else, stupid.”154 A key indicator of this attitude was the success 
of Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? (2004), which ridiculed the electoral choices of 
Kansans, and conservative rural Americans in general, as foolish.155 Given the extant criticisms of 
Hollywood and the entertainment industry, Clinton’s efforts to win Ohio through usage of celeb-
rity surrogates such as Sally Field, the cast of The West Wing, and Top Chef judge Tom Colicchio 
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appeared tone deaf.156 The connection to entertainers and the media further contributed to a per-
ception among working people of the Democratic Party “caring about the cultural, managerial and 
professional elite,” according to political historian Mary Frances Berry, and “not about them.”157  
These various cultural conflicts which underpinned the voting patterns in the 2016 election 
contests in the Midwest could yield many useful studies which delve deeply into various questions 
of political culture, economic history, class analysis, and agrarian politics. These studies could be 
combined with older studies of the region and bolster the recent efforts to revive interest in the 
Midwest led by the Midwestern History Association.158 These studies would be particularly im-
portant if 2016 proves to be a major turning point in Midwestern voting patterns.159 But even if 
the voting of 2016 proves to be a momentary deviation from a longer-term pattern, these studies 
will significantly advance our collective knowledge of the Midwest, a region whose history has 
been sadly neglected in recent decades.160 
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